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INTRODUCTION

According to the U.S. Census projections, the bell is tolling for the
White, non-Hispanic American majority. After 240 years of being either the
entire polity or the majority in the polity, White, non-Hispanic Americans are
expected to become a minority in 2043.' While this change has far-reaching
implications for racial profiling, voting regulations, and education, perhaps the
most significant implication lies in the effect the demise of the majority will
have on doctrines of judicial review that presuppose majoritarian tyranny.
Current approaches to judicial review justify expansive judicial powers
as necessary to protect vulnerable minorities from an overweening majority.
However, the growing heterogeneity of the nation is increasingly transforming
rights conflicts from battles to protect minorities into battles between minorities
seeking to reverse or cabin political losses. 2 The majority tyranny paradigm has
survived despite these changes, for there are still racial and ethnic minorities
that make the current aggregation of judicial power at least marginally
defensible, despite the byproduct of minority-minority reallocations of power.
The emergence of a minority majority, however, will transform all groups into
racial and ethnic minorities. In that context, minority-minority reallocations of
power would not be a byproduct of judicial review but its core function. The
absence of a coherent numerical majority as a driver of majoritarian politics
would make all exercises of judicial review reallocations of power among
competing minorities. In such a context, the balance of power would inevitably
shift from various coalitions of "We the People" to the fixed power of "We the
Court." Though such a polity could remain democratic in theory, it would
function as a judicial oligarchy in practice.
As a result, this Article argues that the transition of the United States
a
from democracy with a numerical White majority to a democracy with a
minority majority requires a corresponding change in the goal of judicial
review-from the protection of minority rights to the empowerment of an
educated citizenry-if it is to remain democratic in fact as well as in name.
This Article draws upon Paulo Freire's theory of empowerment, identifying
Freire's principles of critical consciousness and dialogic praxis as key to the
transformation of the judicial review paradigm.
This Article is divided into four Parts. Part I discusses judicial review
under a coherent, White male majority in the founding era, when shared
cultural assumptions limited the scope of judicial review primarily to economic
issues. Part II discusses the emergence of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities

U.S. Census Bureau ProjectionsShow a Slower Growing, Older, More Diverse Nation a
Half Century from Now, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 12, 2012), https://www.census.gov/
newsroom/releases/archives/population/cb 12-243.html.
2
See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY, EXPANDED EDITION 1080-81
(Kindle ed., 2006).
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in the century between the Civil War and the Civil Rights Movement, using
Plessy v. Ferguson, the Insular Cases, and parental liberty cases as examples of
the ways heterogeneity enlarged the scope of judicial review and discretion.
Part III discusses the emergence of majority minorities during the civil rights
era, and the transformation of judicial protection into judicial insurance through
the proliferation of conflicts over implied rights rooted in identity claims. Part
IV discusses the ways in which Freirean ideals of critical consciousness and
praxis can be adapted to the legal context in order to transform the current
jurisprudence of insurance into a jurisprudence of empowerment.
II.

JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A HOMOGENOUS AMERICA

American judicial review originated in a highly homogenous society
which limited the rights and benefits of citizenship to White males. 3 As a result,
judicial review in the founding era focused on protecting propertied minorities
and relied heavily on textual and historical approaches to constitutional
interpretation-resulting in high levels of political autonomy and "popular
constitutionalism. '' 4 This Section discusses judicial review during this period,
beginning with an overview of the construction of cultural homogeneity in the
early decades of the nation and then exploring the ways in which this
construction helped to limit judicial review to the rights of economic
minorities.
A. Construction of WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant)Hegemony
The Preamble to the U.S. Constitution was a radical innovation,
claiming as it did a power of governance for "the people" at a time in history
when monarchs, emperors, czars, and sultans governed the majority of the
world . However, though "people" is read broadly and inclusively today, the
original preamble was a statement of White cultural hegemony, invoking the
self-governance rights of only a small subset of the individuals then living on
the North American continent: White males of property.6 The American
commitment to democracy and popular sovereignty was instantiated through
new forms of exclusion based on nationality and ethnicity, 7 which presupposed

3

See infra note 6.

4

See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND

JUDICIAL REVIEW 24-29 (discussing the prevalence and practice of popular constitutionalism in
the founding era).
5
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 8 (2005).
6
See id. at 18-21 (noting that the new world ideals of opportunity and mobility were limited
to White males).
7

ANDREAS

WIMMER,

NATIONALIST

EXCLUSION

AND ETHNIC CONFLICT: SHADOWS

OF

MODERNITY 1 (2002).
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the exclusion of African-Americans, Native Americans, and AsianAmericans-basically all non-Whites-from the scope of "We the People." 8 In
order to unite the thirteen colonies and secure the land needed for expansion,
American citizenship was ordered along the lines of a shared racial and ethnic
White identity, which legitimized the oft-times violent exclusion 9of peoples of
color by constructing them as "non-people" and even non-human.
In several of the original colonies, free blacks were able to vote if they
met the property qualifications,' 0 while the Thanksgiving tradition speaks of
the mutual respect and empathy between the original English immigrants and
the Native Americans. With the emergence of American nationalism and the
new White American identity, however, many states disenfranchised their free
blacks, and wars of conquest were increasingly launched against the Native
Americans, often despite the existence of peace treaties."l In addition, between
1790 and 1820, non-British immigration was greatly restricted, and the naturalborn population of the United States almost tripled, facilitating the construction
of a national identity apart from the Old World cultural and religious influences
that new immigrants often brought with them. 12 These political and geographic
exclusions and aggressions facilitated the emergence of the White Anglo-Saxon
Protestant identity as the quintessential "American" identity. 13
As a result of this new national identity, non-White persons were
legally precluded from becoming citizens of the United States throughout the
founding era, 14 while non-Anglo-Saxon, non-Protestant Whites were excluded
from the full benefits of community membership in various ways. 15 More

8

See supra note 6.

9

Paul Finkelman, Slavery in the United States: Persons or Property?, in THE LEGAL

UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY: FROM THE HISTORICAL TO THE CONTEMPORARY 114 (Jean Allain

ed., 2012) (noting that early American laws "effectively reduced slaves to the legal status of wild
beasts, to be 'destroy[ed]' by public authorities without any trial or hearing. Slaves were
property, except when they might 'lie hid and lurk' and then they were reduced to the legal status
of wild creatures"), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
5386&context=faculty-scholarship.
10 AMAR, supra note 5, at 392-93.
1 Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DuKE L.J. 999, 1030-31, 1074 (2014).
12

VINCENT N. PARILLO, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA 71 (2d ed. 2005).

13

JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925, at

9 (1955) ("The concept that the United States belongs in some special sense to the Anglo-Saxon
'race' . . . [was] crystallized in the early nineteenth century as a way of defining American
nationality ...").
14 Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (establishing a
uniform rule of
naturalization).
15 See, e.g., Otto J. Hetzel, Remediation Techniques for Racial Housing Discrimination-An
Introduction to the Symposium, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1461, 1466 (2005) (noting that the British
press often presented the Irish and Anglo-Saxons as different races while New Englanders often
posted signs declaring, "No dogs or Irish allowed"); Patricia M. Wald, Looking Forward to the
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significantly, implicit in the construction of the racially, ethnically, or
religiously different as existing apart from the people, was the construction of
"the people" as lacking racial, ethnic, and religious difference. This constructed
homogeneity contributed to the dearth of minority Bill of Rights cases in the
early decades of the union, for the basic principles of identity and membership
precluded the recognition of visible minorities as "American." ' 6 The minoritymajority rights conflicts that have enlarged the scope of judicial review in the
modem era did not present constitutional questions in the early decades of
American history, for Fourteenth Amendment minorities were constructed as
non-American, 17 and thus possessed no rights under the original Constitution.
B. Minority Status As a Function of PropertyNot Identity
The absence of identity based minorities during the founding era did
not translate into an absence of minorities. The original Constitution was
designed to secure the rights of property owners against socialist
encroachments by state legislatures'8-in other words, to protect a property
owning minority from the redistributive tyrannies of a property-less majority.
As a result, most majority-minority conflicts resolved by the early Supreme
Court centered upon rights in property rather than social rights. For example, of
the seven exercises of judicial review by circuit courts pre-Marbury, six of
them invalidated state statutes that impaired property rights. 19 After Marbury
and before the Civil War, the Supreme Court itself invalidated 31 state statutes,
all of which raised an issue of economic rights and almost two-thirds of which
were invalidated under the Contracts Clause.2 °

Next Millennium: Social Previews to Legal Change, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1085, 1109 (1997)
(suggesting that discrimination against Italians was similar to the discrimination against the
Irish); Melissa Hogan, Note, The Shadow Spreads: Impact of S.B. 1070 and Trends in Modern
Immigration Law, 14 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 551, 568 (2013) (noting the widespread use of
NINA (No Irish Need Apply) signs in the late 1800s rooted in stereotypes of the Irish as "lazy,"
"pugnacious," and "alcoholics").
16 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05 (1857), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[African-Americans were] not included,
and were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and can
therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures
to citizens of the United States.").
17 See supra notes 14-15.
18

See CHARLES A. BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 84-85 (2006).

William Michael Treanor, JudicialReview Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 518-33
(2005) (summarizing the seven cases in which circuit courts invalidated state legislation before
the Marburydecision).
20
See generally U.S. GOV'T PUBL'G OFFICE, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
19

PROVISIONS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL OR HELD To BE PREEMPTED
BY FEDERAL LAW (2014), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-REV-2014/

pdf/GPO-CONAN-REV-2014-12.pdf.
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Given the importance of protection of private property to the drafters of
the Constitution, protections of propertied minorities were inscribed in specific
provisions throughout the constitutional text, 21 susceptible only to a narrowly
defined subset of interpretations. 2 For example, the prohibition of laws
"impairing the obligations of contract" was directed at specific practices of
colonial legislatures that harmed the interests of powerful creditors 23 and was
limited by contract law principles that had been defined across centuries of
English common law-making. The specificity of the constitutional language
and the availability of a large body of precedent served as a natural limit on the
boundaries of judicial review in the area of economic rights. At the same time,
cultural homogeneity and its concomitant creation of shared backgrounds and
authorities served to insulate most non-economic "issues and assumptions from
challenge" 24 and thus from the scope of judicial review. Thus, the exclusion of
Fourteenth Amendment minorities from the polity facilitated the development
of White cultural hegemony and helped to keep the focus of early judicial
review on textually delimited economic rights rather than more general social
rights. This was a major factor in narrowing the scope of judicial review. As
discussed in the next Section, however, the increased visibility and political
power of minorities in the decades following the Civil War produced
fundamental changes in the scope and purpose of judicial review by
challenging the inequalities inherent in White cultural hegemony and making
racial and ethnic equality issues of law rather than of social practice.
III.
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A NEWLY HETEROGENEOUS AMERICA

The emancipation of African-Americans in the 1860s; the acquisition
of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines in the 1890s; and the increased
immigration of Southern and Eastern Europeans between 1880 and 1920,
introduced new, non-economic levels of heterogeneity into American society.
As these new citizens challenged longstanding practices of White supremacy,
judicial review also changed, beginning to articulate novel racial equality
norms and to drift away from strict textual interpretation of the Constitution to
new equality doctrines rooted in prudential concerns for social stability.25 This
Section seeks to chart this progression in judicial review, beginning with the
constitutionalization of White privilege in Plessy v. Ferguson,continuing to the

21

See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.

22

See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 24

(1997) (noting that words have a limited range of meaning, which limits the range of acceptable
interpretations).
23 AMAR, supra note 5,at 127.
24

JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE

THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY Xvii (William Rehg trans., 1998).
25

See infra Part III.A-C.
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constitutionalization of social Darwinism in the Insular Cases, and concluding
with the constitutionalization of judicially derived social and cultural norms in
parental liberty cases.
A. The Emergence of Racial Minoritiesand the Power To
ConstitutionalizeRacial Norms
As soon as an educated middle class emerges among these
[excluded] groups, sufficiently established to resist pressures
for assimilation, they break the silence of subordination and
begin to challenge the national bases of the state. Being
excluded from the privileged seats in the theatre of society by
virtue of their ethnic background, their discourse of injustice
develops along national or ethnic lines as well. They thus draw
on the ideal of ethnic representativity, of equality before the
law, and of the state's responsiveness towards "the people," in
order to demand a "just" representation in government, a
recognition of their cultural heritage as part of the nation's
treasures, a treatment
as equally valuable and dignified parts of
26
"the people."
To a large extent, legally cognizable racial minorities were a product of
the Civil War and the Fourteenth Amendment. The Civil War sought to end the
treatment of African-Americans as property, and the Fourteenth Amendment
sought to secure their treatment as citizens. The recognition of racial equality
between Whites and people of color, however, was virgin constitutional
territory, written at a time when doctrines of Western superiority were used to
justify the widespread colonization and oppression of people of color and to
mask the incompatibility of Western imperialism and Enlightenment
doctrines.2 The English common law and rights tradition, which had informed
the interpretation of the original provisions of the Bill of Rights, limited itself
to protecting the liberties of White men and offered no guidance as to how the
equality rhetoric of the Enlightenment, embedded in the Fourteenth
Amendment, applied to people of color.8 Moreover, the Fourteenth
Amendment's mandate of equality between "superior" and "inferior" races was
both literally unprecedented and seemingly counterfactual; for, in the
worldview of the times, persons of color-particularly African-Americans-

26

WIMMER, supra note 7, at 4.

27

Accord CORNEL WEST, DEMOCRACY MATTERS: WINNING THE FIGHT AGAINST IMPERIALISM

1-14 (2005).
28
See Cohm O'Cinneide, Equality:A ConstitutionalPrinciple?, U.K. CONST. L. ASS'N (Sept.
14, 2011), http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2011/09/14/colm-ocinneide-equality-a-constitutionalprinciple/ (noting that the first arguable common law recognition of equality occurred in Kruse v.
Johnson-30years after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and two years after Plessy).
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were cursed by God to be the slaves of White people. 29 How, then, could they
be "equal"?
As a result, the Amendment's authors, while agreeing on the need for
racial equality, were divided as to what the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee
of equality meant in practice. Was it the substantive equality enshrined in the
Declaration of Independence, which purported to recognize the equal dignity
and freedoms of all human beings, and thus was incompatible with
segregation? 30 Or was it a more procedural equality compatible with
segregation--one that would not dismantle White privilege, but only ensure
that it was maintained through "due process" rather than violence or
coercion? 3' In the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
the former view at first prevailed,
32
but it was the latter view that became law.
This political fluctuation between procedural and substantive equality
was characteristic of the early racial politics of the day, as African-Americans
held the balance of numerical power in the South, but White Southern
Democrats held the social and economic power. The history of railroad
segregation in the years leading up to Plessy v. Ferguson is a case in point.
In 1869, the Republican Louisiana State Legislature passed a law
prohibiting railroad segregation within the state.33 By 1890, the Democratic
Party had regained control of the Louisiana legislature and passed a new
railroad law mandating racial segregation. 34 After Louisiana's AfricanAmerican citizens and legislators failed to prevent the passage of the
segregation law through ordinary politics, they resorted to the courts,35 giving
rise to the infamous case of Plessy v. Ferguson. This resort to the courts as a
second forum in which to fight political battles was not new, for property
owners had had frequent recourse to the courts seeking invalidation of laws
affecting property rights. 36 What was new, however, was the nature of the
29

See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Hate Crimes, Free Speech, and the Contract of Mutual

Indifference, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1283, 1322-23 (2000) (noting the widespread belief that AfricanAmericans are descendants of Canaan, who was cursed to be the "lowest of slaves" to his
brothers).
30
See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 166-67 (1995) (describing
the anti-segregation efforts of Sen. Sumner).
31
This is the view of Justice Harlan in his Plessy v. Ferguson dissent. In the same breath in
which he argues for a color-blind Constitution, he affirms his belief in White privilege,
suggesting that it is something that can be maintained without invidious racial discrimination.
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (emphasis added), overruledby Brown v. Bd. Of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
494 (1954).
32
SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 167-68.
33
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 487 (1877).
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 540.
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 30 (2004).
36
See supra Part II.B.
34
35

TO CIVIL RIGHTS:
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property at issue: namely, White privilege.3" Congress and the political parties
were divided over the status of customary White privilege in the aftermath of
the Civil War,38 and thus the question was deferred to the Supreme Court.
Unlike the Court's power to define traditional property rights, which was
limited by text and common law precedent, the Court's power to define the
scope of White privilege was limited instead by the Court's subjective view of
"national customs and values" and the requirements of social stability.3 9 Thus,
Plessy v. Ferguson, spawned by the rising political power and identity
consciousness of African-Americans, was one of the earliest cases to give the
Court the power to decide questions of culture as well as of law. It defined
American culture, and thus American law, as presupposing White privilege. In
subsequent cases, it would transform White superiority over AfricanAmericans into a general White superiority over
all peoples of color, rooted in
' 40
the constitutionalization of "social Darwinism.
B. Emergence of Ethnic Minorities and the Power To Define
"Fundamental"Rights
Around the same time that Southerners were dealing with the political
ramifications of Black citizenship, Northerners were debating the parameters of
the citizenship of the non-White inhabitants of non-contiguous U.S. territories,
who began to lay claim to constitutional rights by virtue of their acquisition by
the United States at the end of the Spanish-American War. 41 The political
sphere was divided between those who believed the Constitution followed the
flag and those who believed the culture of the inhabitants of the newly acquired
territories made them unsuited for the full panoply of constitutional rights.42
Here, too, the Constitution's assumption of homogeneity and the lack of
precedent recognizing the self-governing capacities of non-Whites produced a

37

Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1707, 1714 (1993).
38
See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 167-68 (discussing the original Senate version of
the 1875 Civil Rights Act, which outlawed segregation in "common schools" as well as public
accommodations, over strong opposition). A year later, the "common school" prohibition was
removed by the House and not reinserted by the Senate. The shifting fate of the school
segregation clause suggests some political uncertainty over the status of "social" as opposed to
"economic" White privilege. Id.
39
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment issue raised in Plessy was a
question of reasonableness, which the Court was at liberty to evaluate "with reference to the
established usages, customs, and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of
their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order").
40

See infra Part II.B.

41

See generally Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (in which a Puerto Rican
unsuccessfully sought to claim the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial).
42
2 EDGAR J. McMANus & TARA HELFMAN, LIBERTY AND UNION: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 313-14 (2013).
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broad judicial discretion to translate unsettled aspects of American social and
political culture into fundamental law.
As it had in the racial context, the Court largely deferred to racists and
nativist sentiments cloaked in concerns for stability. It differentiated between
White territorial populations (designating them "incorporated" territories
entitled to the full panoply of constitutional protections) and non-White
territorial populations (designating them "unincorT orated" territories entitled
only to "fundamental" constitutional protections). Thus, Alaska, a sparsely
populated land easily accessible to White American settlers was incorporated,
but Puerto Rico was not. 44 The Court found that the inhabitants of Puerto Rico
were unprepared for the responsibilities that attended the Constitution's
entitlements. 45 In so doing, the Supreme Court delegated to itself the power to
decide which constitutional rights were truly "fundamental" enough to be
extended even to "semi-civilized" peoples.4 6
In defining the "fundamental" rights of the culturally diverse, as in
defining the equality rights of the racially diverse, the Court's discretion was
informed by its reading of extra-constitutional cultural norms rather than by the
constitutional text.47 These norms, rooted in ideologies of social Darwinism
and American exceptionalism, 48 constructed the non-White peoples of the
tropics as inferior cultures incapable of self-governance and in need of U.S.
colonization and control.49 Such control was justified as tutelage of inferior
races and cultures by a superior race and culture for the ultimate good of the
subject nations.50 Though the Constitution's textual guarantees of equality were
certainly compatible with full constitutional protections of acquired territories,
the vagueness of the text and continued novelty of heterogeneity created
interpretive gaps that allowed the Court to constitutionalize a dominant social
ideology-social Darwinism-in the same way it later constitutionalized the

See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1904).
Compare Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 525 (1905) (holding that Alaska was
an incorporated territory), with Balzac, 258 U.S. at 313 (holding that Puerto Rico was not an
incorporated territory).
45
McMANus & HELFMAN, supra note 42, at 314.
46
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 290-91 (1901) (White, J., concurring) (finding that
"even in cases where there is no direct command of the Constitution which applies there may
nevertheless be restrictions of so fundamental a nature that they cannot be transgressed, although
not expressed in so many words in the Constitution").
47
See MCMANuS & HELFMAN, supra note 42, at 314 (noting that the doctrine of incorporation
was purely a judicial creation with "overtones of national and cultural superiority").
48
See Efrfn Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The Insular
Cases (1901-1922), 65 REv. JuR. U.P.R. 224, 285-89 (1996).
49
See id.
50
Id. at 286.
43

44
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laissez-faire economic ideology. 5' Thus, when the inhabitants of these
territories began to assert their claims to the full range of constitutional rights
and liberties, the Court used its discretion to create a binary classification for
territories that tracked the "civilized vs. savage" binaries of the dominant social
ideologies, 52 and constitutionalized the view construction of America as "the
fittest" culture and thus entitled to rule and expand. This power to
"constitutionalize" favored ideologies and philosophies was a byproduct of the
nation's growing heterogeneity. It planted the seeds for a fundamental
transformation in the nature of judicial review.
C. Emergence of White Ethnic and Religious Minorities and the Power To
Conduct ReasonablenessReview ofAll State Legislation
The growing power of the judiciary to constitutionalize its choice of
cultural and social norms into the law reached its first heyday during the latter
years of the Lochner era. As Germans and Irish Catholics became visible
sources of ethnic and religious diversity, while also claiming increased shares
of political power, the assimilationist model that had protected the White,
Anglo-Saxon Protestant view of American identity began to break down, and
the Court found itself at the center of cultural battles over the changing content
of national identity.5 3 The Court adjudicated these new variations of White
cultural property by expanding its interpretation of liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment:
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the
liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much
consideration and some of the included things have been
definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life,
to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of
his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.54

51

See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

52

See Ramos, supra note 48, at 285-86.

53
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (upholding a challenge to mandatory
schooling in a Protestant-oriented public school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923)
(striking down legislation designed to ensure "that the English language should be and become
the mother tongue of all children reared in [the] state").
54
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
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This definition of liberty read general social norms into fundamental law in a
way not unlike the way in which the Court had read the racial norms of White
privilege and social Darwinism into the law in Plessy and the Insular Cases,
respectively. Thus, in Meyers v. Nebraska, the Court found that due process
liberty barred state restrictions on the rights of parents to control the linguistic
resources of their children,55 and in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, it extended this
analysis-now known as substantive due process-to the rights of parents to
control the education of their children. 56 However, unlike White privilege,
which was a norm implicit in the constitutional text prior to the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment (after which it became contested), and liberty of
contract, which could be read as implicit in the various contracts clauses of the
Constitution, the Court's social due process liberty had no textual anchor. It
was a judicial extrapolation from the textual guarantees of liberty and due
process, based on judicially derived norms and independent of the legislative
deliberations of the citizenry. 57 Thus, under the pressures and opportunities
created by increased heterogeneity, the Court began to define minority rights as
a function of judicially selected principles and ideologies, rather than judicial
interpretations of the constitutional text. 58
D. Establishmentof a ParadigmofMinority Rights Jurisprudence
The expansion of judicial review under the Fourteenth Amendment's
minorities jurisprudence survived the demise of the natural rights paradigm
due, in large part, to the valorization of its decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, widely considered to be the Court's most important contribution to
minority rights. In Brown, the Court departed dramatically from traditional
sources of constitutional interpretation-text, history, and precedent-in order
to redress what is universally considered to have been an egregious denial of
fundamental liberty and equality. 59 The Court's heroic attempt to "speak truth
to power," by daring to name segregation the fundamental violation of equal
protection that it was, placed a halo around the doctrine of judicial supremacy
that emerged lockstep with increased national heterogeneity, and has spawned a

55

Id. at 403.

56

Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.

57
See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403; see also Pierce, 268 U.S. at 536 (finding that the mandate to
attend public school violated due process because it was an "arbitrary, unreasonable, and
unlawful interference with [the school's] patrons and [destroyed] their business and property").
58
See infra Part V.
59
See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art.
3, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professionallnterest/
Pages/CERD.aspx ("States Parties particularly condemn racial segregation and apartheid and
undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this nature in territories under their
jurisdiction.").
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veritable cottage industry of scholarly justifications for "We the Court" as the
ultimate definer and protector of fundamental liberties. Brown v. Board of
Education made the concepts of judicial supremacy and minority rights
protection so seemingly inseverable that the protection of minority rights in the
absence of judicial review is widely perceived as impossible.60 In the
traditional view, Brown demonstrated the need for a strong judiciary willing to
go beyond the text of the Constitution, the will of the majority, and even its
own precedents, in order to protect evolving higher order principles of
fundamental equality, while the backlash against Brown helped create a legal
culture that is committed to judicial supremacy.
What the traditional tale of Brown v. Board of Education misses,

however, in its valorization of strong judicial review and judicial supremacy, is
that the wrong redressed in Brown was one the Court played a central role in
creating. 61 The Civil War Amendments originally allocated the power to
protect minority rights to Congress, 62 which sought to fulfill its mandate
through the various Civil Rights and Enforcement Acts.63 The Court's early
evisceration of the Civil War Amendments 64 and its invalidation of the original
Civil Rights Acts 65 ensured the disenfranchisement of African-Americans in
the South and made it impossible for them to oppose their marginalization
through ordinary political processes-leaving them no recourse aside from the
mercy of the Court. This situation is reminiscent of the story of a young boy

60

See Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils of Popular

Constitutionalism,2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 673, 683 ("The famous Carolene Productsfootnote got it
exactly right: when it comes to politically powerless minorities, or ensuring the workings of the
political process, or safeguarding fundamental rights, the political process-and popular
constitutionalism--cannot be trusted. If there is no judicial review, or no judicial supremacy,
then the checks on persecution of minorities are dramatically reduced, if not eliminated.
Minorities should not need to depend on the majority for their protection.").
61 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 48 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Court's decision reduced the Civil War Amendments to "'splendid baubles,' thrown out to
delude those who deserved fair and generous treatment at the hands of the nation").
62
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
63
See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (prohibited racial discrimination
in public accommodation and jury selection); Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140
(prohibited racial discrimination in voter registration and provided for enforcement of the act by
federal courts and marshals); Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (right of all races to
make contracts and purchase property); see also Constitutional Amendments and Major Civil
Rights Acts of Congress Referenced in Black Americans in Congress, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/BAIC/Historical-Data/
Constitutional-Amendments-and-Legislation/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
64
See generally The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 78 (1872) (holding that Congress
does not have the power to protect the general civil rights of individuals).
65 See generally The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25 (invalidating the Civil Rights Acts on
the ground that they exceeded Congress's power).
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who gained a permanent reputation for kindness and generosity in his local
community by saving a group of baby squirrels. 66 "Remember the
squirrels?... 67First I knocked them out of their nest with a rock.... Then I
saved them.",
The Civil War Amendments and Civil Rights Acts were the beginnings
of a political equality "nest" within which African-Americans might have
grown to (or continued to) exercise genuine political power. The Supreme
Court knocked them out of that nest with a rock; 68 then, almost a hundred years
later, it saved them.
This is not to deny the immense value of the Court's brave renunciation
of the separate but equal paradigm, but merely to observe that it was the
Court's own rulings that made such a brave renunciation necessary. The
Court's refusal to protect African-American civil rights when the constitutional
text, history, and a Congressional majority supported it produced a situation in
which those rights could only be vindicated by bare-knuckled assertions of
judicial supremacy. As a result, the implication of Brown's assertion of such
supremacy is not only that the Court is the champion of minority rights, but,
more soberly, that the Court, and the Court alone, decides when minority rights
should be vindicated and protected and who qualifies as a protectable minority.
This, too, is the legacy of Brown's reification of minority rights jurisprudence.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A POLARIZED SOCIETY

In the decades following the Brown decision, rising identity
consciousness produced unprecedented levels of cultural heterogeneity. As a
result, issues of individual liberties increasingly displaced issues of racial
equality, and constitutional interpretation rooted in social ideologies gave way
to textual interpretations rooted in ethical approaches to the protection of
"implied rights." These two trends led to even greater reductions in political
autonomy and increased focus on "insurance-oriented" judicial review, in
which individuals sought protection from each other rather than from the
government. This Section seeks to chart the rise of the paradigm of judicial
review as insurance, beginning with the emergence of "subjugation-neutral"
protection of minorities, continuing to polarizing identity conflicts, and
concluding with the constitutionalization of social fragmentation-the
foundation ofjudicial review as insurance.

66

See WHILE YOU WERE SLEEPING (Hollywood Pictures 1995).

67

Id.

68

See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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Emergence ofMajority Minorities

After Brown, the minority rights paradigm exploded, as not only
minorities but also distinct segments of the "majority," began to contest their
marginalization in various spheres of American life. The Civil Rights
Movement and the Vietnam War led to a "conscientization" on the part of other
racial and ethnic minorities, feminists, communists, minority protestant sects,
young Americans, and older69Americans-all of whom began to challenge their
political losses in the courts.
Unlike in the earlier cases, such as Plessy v. Ferguson, in which the
lines between the majority (Whites) and the minority (Blacks) were clearly, if
arbitrarily, defined, the lines between the majority and these later minorities
were shifting, blurred, and contingent on perspective. For example, with the
emergence of the Women's Rights Movement, White women remained
members of the White racial majority, but sought judicial protection as
members of a gender minority. Black men remained members of the Black
racial minority, but were now constructed as members of the dominant
patriarchic majority. Prior to the emergence of the double dichotomy between
White women and Black men, the "majority" was constructed as "White
males," and members of the majority could not simultaneously be members of
the minority in any coherent way. The new dichotomy completely destabilized
the category of majority and made dual minority-majority identities, not merely
possible, but an increasing norm.
Thus, by the end of the 1970's, the concept of "discrete and insular
minorities" 7°-minorities who lacked concurrent membership in a powerful
majority group-was dead; "minority" was an individual characteristic, rather
than a function of the political powerlessness and institutionalized oppression
of a marginalized group. 71 Though Brown had reasoned that segregation sent a
message to African-Americans as a group that they were inferior, later cases
focused on individuals, independent of their group membership and whether or
not that group had a history of being marginalized or subjugated.7 3 This meant
that though Whites as a group occupied 90 out of 100 available positions, an

69

See,

e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (challenging successfully the denial of

English language instruction to Chinese students in public schools); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (challenging successfully restrictions on the "right to choose"); United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163 (1965) (successfully challenging doctrinal restrictions on conscientious objector
exemptions).
70
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
71
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (holding that affirmative action policies
designed to remedy past racial discrimination are unconstitutional, but that affirmative action
policies designed to increase diversity in general are acceptable).
72
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
73

See e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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individual White person could still claim racial discrimination if they were
denied the opportunity to fill the 9 1st seat in favor of a non-White person.74 In
the early 1980's, this allowed members of the traditional majority-White
males-to resist affirmative action and other government policies designed to
benefit poor minorities at the expense of White male privilege. 75 The Court's
individual, "subjugation-neutral" minority jurisprudence allowed it to continue
to protect the social and economic benefits of White privilege as forms of
property that, like other property, could not be redistributed through minority
preference programs in the name of equality. 76 Moreover, if the quintessential

hegemonic majority, White males, were entitled to protection under the new
individualized minority rights jurisprudence, minority rights jurisprudence was
effectively unlimited. The Court had the discretion to protect anyone as a
function of any characteristic.
B. The Rise ofPolarizingIdentity Conflicts
As the definition of minority was extended beyond those individuals
denied civil and political rights, minority rights litigation also moved beyond
demands for civil and political rights and began to center on increasingly
polarized conflicts over identity marginalization. The rights litigation of these
new minorities, seeking to secure implied fundamental liberties, differed from
traditional civil and political rights litigation in two respects: purpose and
impact.
1. Differences of Purpose
With few exceptions, civil and political rights (hereinafter "civil
rights") had their roots in the common law and in historical practices of selfgovernance and citizenship. 77 As a result, they were almost universally
conceded to be rights. The purpose of constitutional litigation of civil rights
was generally to update the ways in which those rights were distributed in
modem society, i.e., extending them to women and people of color. The
implied rights paradigm was different. By and large, the implied rights asserted
by the new minorities had no roots in the common law or in the historical
practices of free peoples, for they were the product of destabilized consensus

74

Cf id.

See Harris, supra note 37, at 1768 (describing the Court's affirmative action decisions in
the 1980's as turning not on the "scope of the injury to the subjugated, but [on] the extent of the
infringement on settled expectations of whites").
75

76

See id.

The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 76 (1872) (defining "privileges and immunities"
as the fundamental rights of citizens of free governments).
77
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and the rejection of traditional sources of authority. 78 Thus, the purpose of
constitutional litigation in the implied rights contexts was not to update the
ways in which existing rights were distributed, but to update the very definition
of fundamental rights to include the autonomy needs of formerly inchoate
groups.
For example, in civil rights litigation there existed, on the one hand, a
core of common law civil rights stretching back almost to the English Magna
Carta and, by and large, incorporated into the text of the Constitution.7 9 On the
other, there existed a core of foundational civil and political documents that
asserted the fundamental equality of citizens. 80 The Court's task in civil rights
litigation was merely to combine the two-to use equality to extend the scope
of pre-existing textual constitutional rights. In the human rights context,
however, the Court had to use assertions of fundamental equality to create
completely new rights for new identity groups.
When preexisting textual rights are being extended, judicial discretion
is constrained by the textual exposition of the rights.8' When new rights are
being created, there are no clear limits on judicial discretion. 82 A constitutional
court is free to make rights to abortion 83 and divorce 8 4 fundamental, and the
right to practice religion trivial. 85 It can mandate marriage equality 86 while
constitutionalizing educational inequality. 87 It can overturn state laws to secure
rights of self-protection to gun owners, 88 while prohibiting congressional
efforts to reduce violence against women. 89 The difference in purpose means
that under the implied rights regime, the Supreme Court can elevate any
interest to the status of right and demote any right to the level of an interestgreatly expanding the number of rights and thus the number of rights

78

See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (finding that the Defense

of Marriage Act's purpose of "promot[ing] an 'interest in protecting the traditional moral
teachings reflected in heterosexual-only marriage laws' was illegitimate).
79
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I-X, with English Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2
(Eng.), and MAGNA CARTA (1215).
80
See e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
81 See SCALIA, supra note 22, at 44-46 (discussing the ways in which the text provides a

standard that limits judicial discretion and contrasting that with open-ended "living
constitutionalism," which is often the foundation of implied rights jurisprudence).
82

Id.

83

See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See generally Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
See generally Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

84
85

88

See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
See generally San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).

89

See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).

86
87
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conflicts-while simultaneously diminishing the scope of self-governance and
reducing opportunities for citizen deliberation.
2.

Impact

Civil rights and implied rights also differ in terms of the impact these
conflicts have on social cohesion and fragmentation. Civil rights are primarily
rights to participate in civil society on equal terms through voting and
commerce. 9 0 Implied rights are increasingly rooted in the larger struggle of
individuals with comprehensive identities "to be acknowledged publicly as
what they already really are," 91 and to 92
obtain respect as a particular identity,
rather than in spite of a specific identity.
As a result, assertions of implied rights tend to be qualitatively
different from assertions of civil rights. For example, when the Court refuses to
uphold African-American voting rights in the face of poll taxes, it is placing
severe limitations on the ability of African-Americans to influence law and
politics. When it refuses to uphold gay rights or religious rights, however, it is
not only limiting the freedom to marry or to freely exercise religion, it is also
threatening the legitimacy and continued existence of the underlying gay and
religious identities by suggesting that key elements of those identities are
socially and legally illegitimate. As a result, implied rights cases are a unique
form of high stakes litigation. The threat is not only the permanent
infringement of a right one considers fundamental, but also the loss of the
ability to define the terms of one's identity and existence. While all rights
litigation is controversial, this unique personal dimension makes the opposing
side in many implied rights cases not merely wrong or unjust, but an existential
threat.
C. From Protectionfrom the Government to Protectionfrom the "Other"
One byproduct of the proliferation of identity conflicts is the increased
villainization of opposing views, 93 and thus increased social fragmentation.
90

See e.g., Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2013).

91

KWAME A. APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY 105 (2005).
Id. at 109.

92

93

Compare Monique Ruffin, Occupy Christian Oppression, HUFFPOST BLOG (Mar. 6, 2012,
5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/monique-ruffin/christianity-homophobiajb11819
24.html (stating "[t]oday in many churches all across this nation, we continue to indoctrinate
innocent children in the practice of homophobia"), with Erick Erickson, Barack Obama is Not a
Christianin Any Meaningful Way, REDST. (Feb. 6, 2015, 4:30 AM), http://www.redstate.coml/
2015/02/06/barack-obama-is-not-a-christian-in-any-meaningful-way/ ("Barack Obama is not, in
any meaningful way, a Christian and I am not sure he needs to continue the charade. With no
more elections for him, he might as well come out as the atheist/agnostic that he is. He took his
first step in doing so yesterday in a speech reeking with contempt for faith in general and
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According to Peter McLaren, "[firagmentation occurs when relations of
domination are sustained by the production of meanings in a way which
fragments groups and places them in opposition with one another .... ",9 The
Court's fundamental rights jurisprudence is a method of fragmentation. While
the rights in the original Bill of Rights were the product of legislative
deliberation and drafting, modem implied rights are the product of adversarial
litigation rather than collaboration. The goal of consensus on rights has been
displaced by a bare goal of winning judicial recognition of one's preferred
right. This recognition is contingent on the right's status as "fundamental"-a
status that is often inseparable from the harms flowing from infringement of the
right. As a result, successful assertion of an implied right generally requires the
creation of a sexist, racist, something-ist "Other," from whom one needs
judicial protection. Within such a paradigm, there is no room for reasoned
disagreement and compromise; one is either the person being protected or the
enemy Other from whom the person is being protected, with the judiciary
assigning these labels at its sole discretion. In this context, each recognition of
an implied right produces an additional level of social fragmentation.
A process McLaren describes as "reification" compounds this
fragmentation. Reification occurs "when transitory historical states of affairs
are presented as permanent, natural, commonsensical. 95 For example, the
barbaric cruelties of the Southern Whites after the Civil War and the horrors
perpetuated by the Nazis during the Holocaust were both products of
majoritarian democracy. Reification is the process by which these past
historical instances of tyranny come to be treated as the permanent and
inevitable byproduct of majoritarian democracy. In other words, it is the

Christianity in particular."). See also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2708-09 (2013)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority says that the supporters of this Act acted with malicewith the 'purpose' 'to disparage and to injure' same-sex couples. It says that the motivation for
DOMA was to 'demean,' to 'impose inequality,' to 'impose... a stigma,' to deny people 'equal
dignity,' to brand gay people as 'unworthy,' and to 'humiliat[e]' their children. I am sure these
accusations are quite untrue.... [T]o defend traditional marriage is not to condemn, demean, or
humiliate those who would prefer other arrangements .... It is one thing for a society to elect
change; it is another for a court of law to impose change by adjudging those who oppose it hostes
humani generis, enemies of the human race."); John Hawkins, The Left's War on Christianity,
TOWNHALL.COM (Mar. 9, 2012), http://townhall.com/columnists/johnhawkins/2012/03/09/the_
lefts war on christianity/page/full ("Liberals believe Christians should be mocked, impugned,
and driven from the public square at every opportunity, except when there's an election coming
up.... This should shock no one who has seen the Left enthusiastically support government
sponsored anti-Christian art, sue Christians who want to mention Christ in schools or
courthouses, and even just fight to remove the World Trade Center Cross from the National
September 11th Memorial and Museum.").
94
Peter McLaren, On Ideology and Education: Critical Pedagogy and the Cultural Politics
of Resistance, in CRITICAL PEDAGOGY, THE STATE, AND CULTURAL STRUGGLE 188 (Henry A.
Giroux & Peter McLaren eds., State University of New York Press 1989).
95 Id.
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process by which people come to believe that the majority which tyrannized
African-American and Jewish minorities will always be prone to tyranny and
oppression, but the justices who made the abolition of slavery
unconstitutional,9 6 raised segregation to the level of a binding constitutional
98
principle, 97 and gave their blessing to the involuntary sterilization of millions,
have moved beyond their own tyrannical past to a more enlightened future.
Fragmentation and reification work together within the paradigm of
implied rights to build trust in the judiciary at the expense of trust in one's
fellow citizens. For example, social fragmentation means that no winning
coalition can be certain that it will maintain its majority in subsequent
elections, but must face the ever-present possibility that future elections will
shift power to another coalition. Reification of the historical failures of
majoritarian politics makes the possibility of such a shift alarming in
homogenous societies, 99 and a generator of something akin to political hysteria
in societies marked by high degrees of heterogeneity. This causes a breakdown
in the communicative political processes essential to the operation of
democracy, and diverts power from the many to the few, due to the halo of
stability and security rights jurisprudence casts over the judiciary. The result is
the construction of judicial review as insurance.10 0
One need not look far for examples of the distrust and communicative
breakdowns indicative of the shift to judicial review as insurance. Over the past
six years of President Obama's tenure, the strength of the opposition to
majority rule by the Other has been dramatically displayed, with government
shut downs, 10 filibusters of routine appointments, 10 2 and increased resort to
divisive rhetoric and fear-mongering as sources of political mobilization. 103 In
96
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 414 (1857), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
97
See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
98
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).

99

See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN

ASIAN CASES 25 (2003).

100 See id.
101 Sam Levine, Republicans Hint at Another Government Shutdown over Obamacare.
Seriously., HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 9 2014, 11:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.con/2014/10/
08/obamacare-govemment-shutdown-2014_n_5956270.html.
102
Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger 'Nuclear' Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters on
Nominees, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poisedto-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/2 1/dO65cf
e8-52b6-1 Ie3-9feO-fd2ca728e67c.story.html.
103 John Wihbey, Negative PoliticalAds, the 2012 Campaign and Voter Effects: Research
Roundup, JOURNALIST RESOURCE (May 6, 2013), http://journalistsresource.org/studies/politics/
ads-public-opinion/negative-political-ads-effects-voters-research-roundup#sthash.k2GNPzHi.
dpuf.
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such an atmosphere, judicial review has been pursued for the limitations it
places on majority rule by victorious coalitions of minorities, which limit the
maximum amount of harm the Other can do in the season "the People" are out
of power. It also functions as a forum of "second chances" through which "the
People" can continue to oppose and stymie the policies of an enemy Other, who
commands a temporary majority. It is, in effect, an insurance policy for
minimizing losses and obtaining second chances.
The emergence of a minority majority in 2043-which effectively is
not a new majority at all, but rather the end of racial and ethnic majoritieswill raise the visibility of the Other to an unprecedented level and shift an even
larger share of political power to peoples of color. As peoples of color have
never been completely assimilated into the polity, due to the continuing
embeddedness of White privilege in our Constitution and institutions10 4 and the
enduring legacy of school and residential segregation,10 5 this new visibility is
highly likely to produce an even more strident political hysteria than President
Obama's election. In evaluating this observation, it is helpful to remember that
the American republic and its Constitution were originally conceived and
10 6
instantiated as a government by consent only for the propertied White elite,
and that the Supreme Court itself was created to safeguard the property
interests and privileges of those elites.107
Moreover, the strict dichotomy in America between a White "us" and a
non-White "them" has persisted throughout our 200 year history, with the most
expansive forms of self-governance marking periods of social, political, and
legal dominance by a White majority, and the most limited forms of selfgovernance emerging alongside the rise in the social and political visibility of
minorities.10 8 For example, as discussed in Section II, the increased social,
political, and legal power of people of color has grown in lockstep with the
increased social, political, and legal power of a judiciary dominated by a White
majority and most responsive to the interests of White elites.10 9 In addition, the
text and principles upon which the Court relies in its constitutional
interpretation continue to presuppose the aim of securing the interests and
privileges of a White elite, despite the rights revolution brought about by the
tardy enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment. This cautions against a rising
majority of color continuing to valorize judicial protection of "minority" rights
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See generally Harris, supranote 37, at 1716-20.
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in the face of increased resort to judicial review as insurance against their
participation in democratic governance.
For, as Audre Lorde has noted, one cannot "us[e] the master's tools to
tear down the master's house.""10 Traditional approaches to the Constitution,
which reject poverty as a suspect class, elevate racially distributed liberties over
remedies for inequality, and foreclose recognition of socio-economic rights that
would decrease the economic disparities between racial and ethnic groups, are
neither democracy enforcing nor minority empowering. They were designed to
protect a plutocracy, and they import the appendages of that purpose into every
new context in which they are applied. As a result, over time, the Fourteenth
Amendment has been suborned into the service of preserving an enduring
White plutocracy in an increasingly brown America.
One lasting effect of this is a paradigm of judicial review with the
potential to operate in exactly the same way as Black Codes and Jim Crow laws
in the South, preserving the dominance of a White minority in the face of the
threat of a new and politically active majority of color. Though methods of
fragmentation have replaced methods of coercion, insurance-oriented judicial
review rests on a similar elevation of fear of the Other above fidelity to
promises of democratic autonomy. It cannot be trusted to resolve the
fundamental challenges of a new pluralistic America neutrally. Instead, in order
to ensure that a new "We the People"-composed primarily of individuals
excluded from the scope of the original social contract-have powers of selfgovernance comparable to that originally secured by the Constitution, a new
approach to constitutional interpretation is needed. The outdated focus on
protecting a subjectively defined minority from the majority needs to be
replaced with an empowerment approach to jurisprudence, that has as its goal
self-governance by an educated citizenry rather than the disempowerment or
control of an increasingly brown majority.
V.

JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A MAJORITY-MINORITY SOCIETY

As noted above, judicial review for empowerment is an essential next
step for a maturing democracy under conditions of plurality. Citizen
empowerment, rather than implied rights, must become the focus of judicial
review and judicial doctrines must be refrained to allow room for citizen
deliberation and autonomy. This Section seeks to provide the broad outlines of
judicial review for empowerment, identifying two general prerequisites that
must be satisfied if judicial review is to help create the conditions under which
a pluralistic polity can engage in a more enlightened form of self-governance:
conscientization and praxis. It begins with a discussion of conscientization: the
need for the polity to become critically aware of the growing judicial
110 AUDRE LORDE, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in SISTER
OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 110, 112 (1984).
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restrictions on self-governance and political autonomy. Next, it discusses
praxis-dialogue coupled with transformative action-as possible only within a
paradigm of shared constitutionalism, which the Author titles "judicial review
for empowerment."
A.

Conscientization
I know no safe depositary of the ultimate powers of the society
but the people themselves; and ifwe think them not enlightened
enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion,
the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their
discretion by education. This is the true corrective of abuses of
constitutionalpower. 11

Jurisprudence for empowerment, like education for empowerment,
must begin with the development of a critical consciousness. "We the People"
must first become critically conscious of their position as the object, rather than
the subject, of governance before they can hope to challenge a system of
jurisprudence that has become increasingly oligarchic as the nation has become
more heterogeneous. The paradigm of judicial insurance creates the false
illusion of "We the Court"-the Court as an ally of minority interests broadly
defined, rather than as an independent power that constructs itself as superior
and external to the people. The rights doctrines that inform insurance-oriented
judicial review cloaks judicial dominance in the language of equality and
protection of the vulnerable.1 2 This is a species of "false generosity" that
constrains the fearful and subdued, the rejects of life, to extend
their trembling hands. True generosity lies in striving so that
these hands-whether of individuals or entire people's-need
be extended less and less in supplication, so that more and
hands which work and, working,
more they become human
13
transform the world.
As democracies mature and political rights become more widespread, judicial
review as protection becomes an impediment to, rather than an essential
element of, the realization of democratic aims, for its existence presupposes
that minorities can never be fairly accommodated within a democratic system.
Such an orientation risks legitimizing paradigms that construct political

I

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), in 12 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 161, 163 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905).
112 See e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
113 PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 45 (Bloomsbury 2000).
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inequality11in
order to maintain the need for judicial intervention in the name of
4
the same.
The rejection of judicial protection in favor of self-empowerment can
be facilitated by others, but must originate with the people themselves. 115 For
the ordinary masses of the people to initiate such change, they must first
become critically conscious of their subordination and of their power to change
their reality.11 6 They must first become conscious of the Supreme Court as a
distinct institution that is neither their ally nor the divine embodiment of the
Constitution made flesh. They must come to see it instead as it is: a government
institution staffed by individuals who are equally human and thus, equally
prone to both greatness and error. More importantly, they must see it as an
institution that they have the power to change. The key to critical
consciousness is the same across all contexts: information.
Currently, the only way ordinary citizens can obtain specific
information about the way in which the Court operates is to travel to
Washington, D.C., in hopes of snaring one of the 250 seats available" l7 to
members of the public attending an oral argument. The American population is
over 320 million, 1 8 but only 250 people are permitted access to the oral
arguments by which the Court will decide, for all 320 million who can and
cannot get married in the nation, 1 9 whether the nation can provide universal
healthcare, 120 and even the decorations communities across the nation can
display during the holiday season. 121 In a time when almost all information is
communicated visually, the Supreme Court communicates solely through post
hoc audiotapes and dense, written opinions. This ensures that, aside from the
legal aristocracy, the wider citizenry's knowledge of the Court is limited to
sporadic headlines about its most controversial cases. As a result, few people
know who the Supreme Court justices are, with barely
a quarter of Americans
22
able to identify John Roberts as the Chief Justice. 1

114

See id. at 44 (In order to have an opportunity to express "false generosity ... oppressors

must perpetuate injustice.").
115
Id. at 66 ("[W]hile no one liberates himself by his own efforts alone, neither is he liberated
by others.").
116

Id. at47.

17
Kenneth W. Starr, Open Up High Court to Cameras, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/03/opinion/open-up-high-court-to-cameras.html?_r-0
(noting
that there are only 250 public seats available at Supreme Court Oral Arguments).
118
U.S. Population and World Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Apr. 3, 2015),

http://www.census.gov/popclock.
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See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
See generallyNat'l Fed'n oflndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
See generally Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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The incremental construction of a judicial oligarchy has benefitted
greatly from the truth of the old adage, "[O]ut of sight out of mind." 123 If it is to
be dismantled, the Supreme Court must be brought into sight and into mind.
124
Scholars have already urged the Court to allow broadcasts of its proceedings,
and this Article endorses that approach. Broadcasting Supreme Court
proceedings, however, is not the only, or most immediate, way of making the
Court visible. This Article urges that calls for the broadcasting of Supreme
Court proceedings be supplemented by education. It urges teachers in public
high schools and undergraduate colleges to make the invisibility of the
Supreme Court visible to the rising majority passing through their hands by
encouraging students to question the purposes of this invisibility and the ends
that it serves.
Numerous plans have been conceived by scholars to stall or reverse
progress towards a judicial oligarchy, from terms limits for justices 125 to the
abolition of judicial review altogether. 126 Before any of these plans can be
meaningfully implemented, however, the non-legal public must become
critically conscious of the processes by which judicial supremacy has been
27
entrenched in American democracy and of their own power to effect change. 1
This must begin by demystifying the Supreme Court and constructing judicial
review as something that occurs within, rather than beyond, society. In essence,
conscientization is the "Protestant reformation" of judicial review by which
ordinary individuals cease to unquestioningly accept authoritative
pronouncements about the meaning and purpose of constitutional principles,
instead, become conscious of their own interpretative resources and authority
as the heirs in authorship of the original "We the People," whose values and
principles the constitutional text is designed to embody. Such conscientization
is especially crucial for the nation's racial and ethnic minorities; for, as long as
these minorities view the Supreme Court as their savior rather than recognizing
its role in facilitating their oppression, they will be unable, as the new majority,
to engage in the political activism and reform that is so essential to restoring the
democratic foundations of American government. This rising majority is still in
the nation's classrooms; thus, education that promotes conscientization is key
to their empowerment. It is only when "the People" become critically conscious
of the doctrine of judicial supremacy, and of their own historical claim to a
more populist supremacy, that they can engage in transformative praxis.

123

Id.

124

CHEMERINSKY, supra note

125

Id. at 310-12.
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See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 154-76 (2000).
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FREIRE, supra note 113, at 64 ("As long as the oppressed remain unaware of the causes of

109, at 325.

their condition, they fatalistically 'accept' their exploitation. Further, they are apt to react in a
passive and alienated manner when confronted with the necessity to struggle for their freedom
and self-affirmation.").
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B. Dialogic Praxis
The dialogue and transformative action at the heart of praxis requires a
shared constitutionalism that is only possible within a paradigm of
empowerment jurisprudence. Only an empowerment paradigm can
accommodate minorities as collaborating subjects, reflecting and acting upon
the world to transform it instead of being the objects of another's
transformative efforts. This is not a call to eliminate judicial review, but a call
to restructure the process of judicial review so that the citizenry is included in
the elucidation of enduring constitutional values-a jurisprudence "with,"
rather than "for," the people.
Judicial review in pluralistic societies cannot be limited to the creation
of minority-majority rights dichotomies, but must also promote "collaboration
among subjects who recognize one another, in their reciprocally related rights
and duties, as free and equal citizens." 128 Once a meaningful level of
fundamental rights has been secured, the preconditions of "government by
discussion" must also be secured, so that those given a "voice" under the
Court's rights jurisprudence have not merely an opportunity to speak, but also a
meaningful opportunity to be heard. For the ideal of a democratic society
requires more than freestanding individuals formally constructed as equal; it
requires collaboration as equals in the maintenance of the social order. It falls
to higher law to institutionalize this collaboration in terms that are
communicative rather than merely strategic. Democratic decision-making is
impossible without consensus. As identity politics and rights conflicts
increasingly dismantle the shared understandings and authorities that generated
consensus on fundamental premises in the past, 129 a new countervailing source
of consensus is needed. Using process-based jurisprudence to institutionalize
dialogue and deliberation taps into the latent unifying potential of law to secure
democracy in the face of social difference and fragmentation. 130
The premise of jurisprudence for empowerment is constitutionalism
shared between the judiciary and a diverse people. It differs from existing
rights jurisprudence in two ways. First, it divides the world of judicial review
into two distinct spheres: constitutional questions and socio-political questions
(akin to the now defunct 13' distinction between constitutional questions and
political questions). Socio-political questions are questions that require the
elucidation of the rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty', 32 and "so
HABERMAS, supra note 24, at 88.
Id. at xvii ("Pluralization and disenchantment undermine the ways in which communities
can stabilize themselves against shared background and authorities that removed certain issues
and assumptions from challenge.").
128

129

130

Id. at318.

131 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 113, 138-39 (2000).
132

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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rooted in the traditions and conscience of [the American] people as to be
ranked as fundamental." 133 These questions will normally entail either (1) a
conflict between two minorities asserting competing express or implied rights,
or (2) a conflict over restrictions on actions central to the enactment of
fundamental personal identities-i.e., enactments of a religious identity that
conflict with enactments of a gay identity.
These questions are separated out from traditional judicial review
because they create rights controversies that cannot be resolved through
adversarial litigation without mandating nationwide denigration or
marginalization of the fundamental interests of a subgroup of the citizenry-a
common result under insurance-oriented review. 134 Instead, empowerment
jurisprudence makes judicial resolution of socio-political questions
contingently politically binding on nonparties, rather than permanently
constitutionally binding. This means that laws invalidated on socio-political
grounds would be deemed invalid for a maximum of two years, after which,
they could be reenacted by the legislature, subject only to a process-based
judicial review centered upon "political participation, dialogue and public
interaction."'' 35 This would not affect finality for the parties to the original case,
but would temper the wider anti-democratic effects on nonparties by leaving
the political process open to dissent.
In the first instance, this approach would reduce polarization and
fragmentation by lowering the stakes of constitutional litigation and reducing
incentives to resort to judicial review as "insurance" against political losses.
Any judicial victories over the Other would be limited to one election cycle,
making it impossible to rely on judicial review as a second "bet the house"
strategy that incentivizes the avoidance of engagement, dialogue, or
compromise. Instead, all competing coalitions would be redirected to the
political process, where subsequent victories on both sides-maintaining the
law against a second attack or successfully challenging the law a second timewould first require evidence of genuine dialogue and efforts at compromise. As
Cass Sunstein noted,
Widespread error and social fragmentation are likely to result
when like-minded people, insulated from others, move in
extreme directions ...because of limited argument pools and
parochial influences. In terms of designing institutions, and
even [interpreting] constitutions, the best response is to ensure

133 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
134 See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1992)

(attributing such marginalization to the polarization of the abortion debate).
135

AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 326 (2009).
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that members of deliberating groups, whether small or large,
will not isolate themselves from competing views.. 136
Empowerment jurisprudence seeks to incorporate this insight into the
core function of judicial review. It calls for courts to go beyond protection of
minorities to facilitation of their empowerment by constitutionalizing the
conditions necessary for them to engage in democratic deliberation with others
on terms of equal regard. For free citizens must make their own laws; 137 they
cannot simply be protected from the bad laws others make.
Though calling for judges to promote collaboration and dialogue on
terms of equal regard is a species of process based judicial review,
empowerment jurisprudence attempts to avoid the substance-process
dichotomy by adopting elements of both and using the strengths of the latter to
compensate for the weakness of the former. In this way, empowerment
jurisprudence still allows the judiciary to take the lead in recognizing the
fundamental rights of unpopular or vulnerable minorities, but subjects such
recognition to popular ratification in a way that does not become unworkable
under conditions of pluralism. For example, Article V was written for a
homogenous society with widely shared background assumptions that tempered
disagreements and made supermajority consensus across states possible. The
diversity of the civil rights generation and its nationalist orientation required
the evolution of a new way of amending the Constitution, focused on politics
and separation of powers at the national level. 138 The demise of the majority
and emergence of a minority majority may make it impossible for coalitions to
reach the completely theorized agreements 139 necessary to gain control of all
three branches of government. Thus, empowerment jurisprudence seeks to offer
yet a third way of expressing the will of the people on issues of fundamental
values: judicial facilitation of collaboration and dialogue between competing
coalitions.
Allowing Congress and state legislatures to overturn Supreme Court
rulings on socio-political questions means that some rights that the Court
recognizes as fundamental will not be permanently validated as fundamental in
the political arena. However, the two-year period of invalidation and the
provision for process-based judicial review of subsequent enactments allows
the Court to continue to serve its core function of tempering majority passions
in times of crisis by delaying implementation of the law and ensuring that

136

CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 40 (2001).

137

IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS

xxviii (Mary Gregor &

Jens Timmerman trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 2012) (noting that "it is the mark of free
citizens to make their own laws...").
138 See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 4-5 (2014).
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attempts at re-passage are the product of intercoalition dialogue rather than
political hysteria.
At the state level, a potential drawback of the limited two-year
invalidation and the option of subsequent re-passage is that different
communities may develop different answers to the same socio-political
questions, leading to differences between the states in their recognition of
"fundamentals." However, questions that seek to define the rights "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty" 140 are not esoteric legal questions susceptible to
a single universal right answer. They are human questions about the paths to
freedom, equality, human dignity, and community to which "We the People,"
no less than "We the Court," can articulate a "right" answer rooted in the
nation's fundamental principles. 41 The fact that these answers may differ from
one state to another does not imply that one of them is wrong, 142 but merely
that different but equally fundamental American principles were given different
levels of priority in different states-an approach fully consonant with original
constitutional understandings. The strength of nationalism lies in shared
fundamental principles-incompletely theorized agreements-rather than in
their specific instantiation in any particular context. If, however, nationalization
of a specific instantiation of a fundamental principle is perceived as needed by
the people, the proper locus of such harmonization is the People or its
Congress, with the Court limited to ensuring the preconditions for a
collaborative dialogue among equals.
VI. CONCLUSION

In new democracies, where power is concentrated in a few hands and
large portions of the citizenry are effectively disenfranchised, judicial review as
protection of minority rights is essential for the survival of democracy and is
needed to fulfill a "schoolmaster" function for young governments. As
governments mature and power distributions equalize through mass
enfranchisement, however, judicial review as protection becomes problematic,
because no matter how widespread civil and political rights become, its
existence continues to presuppose that minorities cannot be integrated into the
democratic system, but must always be separately defined and protected. This
presupposition is particularly problematic in societies like America, where
increased diversity will soon make everyone a minority and effectively redefine
the protective function of judicial review from protecting people from their
government to protecting them from each other.
In order for the democratic promise of self-governance to be realized in
such a pluralistic society, conscientization and praxis are essential first steps.
140

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).

141 See generallyRONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (Harvard Univ. Press 1978).
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The veil of secrecy, behind which the Court decides which minorities to protect
and when, must be lifted, and the gaps, inconsistencies, and bare judicial
extrapolations that underlie its determination of implied rights must be made
visible and accessible. Self-governance requires transparency, and minorities
cannot "choose" minority protection over political autonomy, much less seek to
rebalance the two, if they are denied access to information about the process of
judicial review and about the Court that determines the nature of such review.
Moreover, hidden exercises of power are the hallmark of oppression rather than
freedom; a "free" people cannot long remain in that state if they take no notice
or have no knowledge of the ways in which power is allocated and used within
their polity. Thus, if America is to remain a democracy in the coming decades,
the conscientization of the people-particularly the rising minority majorityis crucial.
However, self-governance, like liberation, cannot be bestowed as a
gift. 143 Thus, after conscientization, minorities themselves must actively seek to
change the doctrines and practices that limit them to being the objects of
another's protection and restrict their ability to become the subjects of their
own empowerment. For the best the Court can do under protection-oriented
judicial review is make the rights of minorities subject to the whims of the
court, rather than to the whims of the majority-a substitution that is not
guaranteed to be an improvement, 144 and in diverse democracies with a
minority majority, is particularly likely to be a handicap. Accordingly, when
democracies have matured to the point of meaningful universal
enfranchisement, judicial review must also mature-shifting its focus from
protection to empowerment-or the democratic enterprise itself will regress.
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FREIRE, supra note 113, at 66.
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